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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-1496
________________
GEORGE RUSSELL JOSEPH,
                   Petitioner
       v.
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency No. A43 578 078
on January 18, 2006
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
SEPTEMBER 22, 2006
Before: BARRY, CHAGARES AND COWEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed June 13, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
     1  It is not clear if this is Petitioner’s correct name.  Petitioner filed his petition for
review under the name of “George Russell Joseph.”  His brief is signed “Russell J.
George” and alternatively refers to himself as “Mr. Russell.”  As our caption reflects the
name he used in his petition for review, we will refer to petitioner as “Joseph.”
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PER CURIAM
George Russell Joseph is a native and citizen of Trinidad and Tobago.1 Joseph
seeks review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), upholding an
Immigration Judge’s decision that found him removable and ineligible for cancellation of
removal.  Because Joseph is ineligible for cancellation of removal, we will deny the
petition for review.
Joseph entered the United States in December 1992 as a conditional resident.  He
became a permanent resident in December 1994.  He was placed in removal proceedings
by a notice to appear, dated June 15, 2005, which charged him with being removable for
having committed a controlled substance violation and an aggravated felony.  The
Immigration Judge (IJ) found him removable for the controlled substance violation, but
found that the Government had not met its burden of showing that any of his convictions
was also an aggravated felony.  The IJ found Joseph ineligible for cancellation of removal
under INA § 240A(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)], the only relief for which he applied.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, specifically noting that the IJ
did not err in denying cancellation of removal, because Joseph had not accrued 5 years of
continuous presence from the time he was admitted as a permanent resident in December
     2 The BIA noted that Joseph’s argument that he had not committed an aggravated
felony was irrelevant, as he was not found removable on that ground, and that it could not
entertain his arguments concerning his continued detention outside the context of bond
hearings.
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1994 to the time he was convicted of a controlled substance violation in January 1998.2 
Joseph timely filed a petition for review and a motion for stay of removal. 
Pursuant to section 242(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) [8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)], we lack jurisdiction to review “any final order of removal
against an alien who is removable” because of a controlled substance violation. 
However, the REAL ID Act of 2005 restored direct review of constitutional claims and
questions of law presented in petitions for review of final removal orders. See INA
§ 242(a)(2)(D) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)]; see Papageorgiou v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 356,
358 (3d Cir. 2005). We therefore may consider whether the BIA correctly applied the law
in denying Joseph cancellation of removal.
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, the Attorney General may, in his discretion, cancel
the removal of an alien who has been:  (1) lawfully admitted for permanent residence for
not less than five years, (2) if the alien has also continuously resided in the U.S. in any
status for seven years, and (3) if the alien has not committed an aggravated felony. 
However, the calculation of the period of continuous residence required for relief stops
when an alien commits a controlled substance violation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) [INA
§ 240A(d)(1)].   As the Government candidly explains in its brief, this “stop-time”
provision applies only to the second requirement listed above; i.e., that the alien has
     3 In his brief, Joseph argues that he did not commit an aggravated felony.  His
argument is irrelevant, as he was not found removable for having committed an
aggravated felony.  We agree with the Government that other issues in his brief regarding
adjustment of status and parole for arriving aliens have no relevance to this petition for
review.  
We note that Joseph also challenges his continued detention.  Challenges to
post-removal order detention should be raised in a habeas petition filed in the appropriate
District Court. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)
(only eliminating district court's habeas jurisdiction over orders of removal).
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continuously resided in the U.S. for seven years after having been admitted in any status. 
See Matter of Perez, 22 I&N Dec. 689, 692 n.2 (BIA 1999) (en banc).  The stop-time
provision does not apply to the first requirement. Id.
The BIA erroneously found that Joseph had not met the first requirement of five
years of permanent residence, since Joseph had been a permanent resident for over nine
years at the time of the IJ’s decision.  However, Joseph is ineligible for cancellation of
removal under the second step (lack of continuous residence for seven years), because
Joseph, who was admitted to the United States in December of 1992, committed a
controlled substance violation, triggering the statute’s “stop-time” provision, in August of
1997.  He thus did not accrue seven years of “continuous residence” under the statute.3  
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
